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Abstract
We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today
depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different
sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial
consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus ex post heterogeneity in
preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare,
consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing
the profits of the first period seller, relative to the situation where consumption
choices are observed by the later seller.
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1 Introduction
Do supermarkets encourage wasteful purchases of goods with a limited shelf-
life, such as fruit or vegetables? Do fast-food restaurants induce over-consumption?
An important feature of consumers’ preferences in these markets is inter-temporal
substitutability: if a patron has a heavy lunch, she is less hungry at dinner. If a
consumer buys a two-for-one deal on salads or ready meals at the supermarket, he is
less likely to buy similar goods when stopping at the local store. In these instances,
purchases at different dates are substitutes. A different set of examples concerns habit
formation or goods where taste can gradually develop. A student who frequents music
concerts is more likely to enjoy them later in life, so that consumptions across dates
are complements. Here, the concern is that the club or venue today may not take
into account the effect of its decisions upon clubs in other cities tomorrow. In both
types of example, purchases at different dates are often from different suppliers. In
the context of grocery stores and supermarkets, multi-store shopping is a widespread
and well-documented phenomenon: a large share of consumers visit more than one
store, often on different days.1
In this paper, we study optimal nonlinear pricing in the presence of either in-
tertemporal substitutability or complementarity. Consumers’ privacy plays an im-
portant role in our analysis. It has a profound effect on equilibrium per-unit price
dispersion, social welfare and the allocation of surplus between the market partic-
ipants. In particular, consumers are better off and social welfare is higher when
transactions are private.
We develop a model in which consumer’s willingness to pay for a good depends
on past consumption, and in which a consumer who shops with a supplier today
is unlikely to return tomorrow. To focus on the dynamic implications of endoge-
nous choices, we assume that consumers are identical— differences in taste arise
only due to differences in past consumption. Furthermore, we assume that a sup-
plier at any date has monopoly power—e.g., because of search frictions—so that
the market is characterized by serial monopoly. We assume that consumers have a
quasilinear utility and that willingness to pay for today’s consumption y depends on
the past consumption x, and is given by the function u(x, y). When consumptions
are substitutes, u is strictly submodular; when they are complements, u is strictly
supermodular.
We allow sellers to offer unrestricted non-linear prices and analyze the nature of
inter-temporal competition. We consider a simple two-period model. In the bench-
1 Fox et al. (2004) and Thomassen et al. (2017) document evidence of multi-stop shopping in
the US and in the UK respectively.
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mark case, where consumption today is observed by the tomorrow’s seller, our in-
tuitions are confirmed—the first period seller induces over-consumption relative to
the efficient allocation when u is submodular, and under-consumption when u is su-
permodular. The intuition is straightforward: since the future seller will extract the
buyer’s surplus, the monopolist today seeks to induce the consumption level that
maximizes the consumer’s utility when she exercises her outside option tomorrow.2
This is larger than the efficient amount when u is submodular, and smaller when u
is submodular.
Our main focus however, is on the more realistic case where neither the consumer’s
past consumption nor the past price offers are observed by the current seller. Our
first result is that there cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium where consumption is
deterministic, both when u is submodular and when it is supermodular. The intuition
for this is both simple and subtle: if first period consumption is deterministic and
second period purchases are positive, then the consumer must be indifferent between
the second-period seller’s offer and her outside option, since the former fully extracts
the consumer’s surplus. However, in this case, seller 1 and the consumer can increase
their joint surplus, either by increasing first period consumption or by reducing it.
More generally, if the consumer is indifferent between her consumption level and
seller 2’s offer in any equilibrium, pure or mixed, then seller 2 must exclude this
consumer, i.e. seller 2’s offer to this consumer must be zero. Consequently, in any
equilibrium, first period consumption choices must be random, thereby generating
private information and informational rents for consumers in the second period, as
well as the required exclusion for the consumers with the lowest marginal willingness
to pay. Even if consumers are ex ante identical, the first period seller offers a large
set of quantities, giving rise to ex-post taste heterogeneity.
Our main finding is that equilibrium outcomes are essentially unique.3 The first
period monopolist offers a large menu, which ranges between the efficient quantity
and that chosen in the observable consumption case. The consumer, who is indif-
ferent between all bundles in the menu, chooses an item according to a continuous
distribution with full support. This induces an endogenous screening problem in
the second period, since the consumer has private information about her past con-
sumption. We find that the consumer and the second-period seller benefit from
2This finding is reminiscent of the literature on long-term contracts, e.g. Diamond and Maskin
(1979) or Aghion and Bolton (1987), where payoffs and utility are time separable. Here, contracts
are short-term, but future utility depends on current consumption.
3All equilibria have the the same distribution over first and second period consumptions. They
differ (possibly) only in terms of the distribution of payoffs between the first period seller and the
consumer.
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unobservability, whereas the first-period seller loses, as compared to the observable
consumption benchmark. Furthermore, consumer privacy unambigiously increases
total welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3 sets out the model, and examines the case where the second
period seller observes past consumption. Section 4 analyzes private transactions
and establishes existence and essential uniqueness of an equilibrium where consumer
heterogeneity arises endogenously, and examines how privacy affects welfare and
consumer surplus. The final section concludes. All missing proofs can be found in
the appendix.
2 Related literature
Consumer privacy has become an important issue in the era of electronic records,
big data and Internet shopping—see Acquisti et al. (2016) for a comprehensive sur-
vey of the topic. If past consumption decisions are observable, this may allow firms
to identify the consumer’s persistent type, thereby creating opportunities for price
discrimination. When the consumer interacts repeatedly with the same firm, Taylor
(2004) shows that a naive consumer may be exploited by the firm. However, if
the consumer is sophisticated, then the firm may want to commit to not utiliz-
ing personal data, in order to avoid the ratchet effect, an argument that is also
made by Villas-Boas (2004). In our setting, firms will not voluntarily make such
a commitment, since making transactions public increases their monopoly power.
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) study behavior-based price discrimination, where the
consumer’s current choices reveals her relative preference for different brands.
Our model differs considerably from this literature, since we assume ex ante ho-
mogeneity of consumers. Heterogeneity therefore arises only because of differences
in past consumption choices, and these are endogenous. Thus conceptually, our work
is more closely related to models with hidden actions, e.g. work on static moral haz-
ard with renegotiation (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Ma (1991)). Similarly,
Gonza´lez (2004) and Gul (2001) analyze the hold-up problem with unobservable
investment.
Calzolari and Pavan (2006) examine how upstream firms sell information about
consumers’ preferences and choices to downstream firms in an environment with
indivisible goods and binary consumers’ valuations. They characterize the conditions
under which the upstream firms offer the consumers full privacy.
The inefficiencies we highlight relate to the literature on long-term bilateral con-
tracts in a multilateral environment. Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Aghion and Bolton
3
(1987) show that a buyer-seller pair today may induce inefficiency via long term con-
tracts, in order to extract surplus from a future seller. Our contracts are static and
the dynamics are induced by the agent’s preferences. Furthermore, our focus on
private transactions differs from this literature, which assumes that the future seller
observes the past contract.
Our model bears some formal similarity with models of common agency (Bernheim and Whinston
(1986); Martimort and Stole (2002)). The principals in these models correspond to
our sellers, and the agent to the consumer. A key difference is that the consumer’s
decisions are sequential in our model. When a consumer receives an offer from a
seller today, she does not have the option of revising her purchases yesterday. We
discuss this difference in more detail at the end of section 4.1. Whereas common
agency models have a plethora of equilibria and use refinements such as truthfulness
to single out a few, we find that equilibrium outcomes are essentially unique.
3 The model
The consumer, who lives for two periods, visits seller 1 in the first period and
seller 2 in the second period. Her utility is
u(x, y)− p− q,
where x and y is consumption in the first and second period respectively, and p and
q are the payments made to sellers 1 and 2 respectively. The value of consumption in
the second period depends on the level of consumption in the first period. We assume
that u is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable.
We assume throughout that either A1 or A2 holds:
A1: u(x, y) is strictly supermodular.
A2: u(x, y) is strictly submodular.
Given this assumption, we will dispense with the qualifier “strictly” in the remainder
of this paper.4
Each seller has constant marginal cost k. Since a seller interacts with the con-
sumer only for one period, he seeks to maximize his flow profit. We allow each seller
to choose non-linear prices. Thus seller 1 chooses an arbitrary lower semi-continuous
function p : R+ → R+, where p(x) is a price for a bundle of size x, and similarly,
seller 2 chooses a lower semi-continuous function q : R+ → R+.
4That is, the statement “u is submodular” should be read as “u is strictly submodular”.
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The socially efficient level of consumption (x∗, y∗) is defined as follows. Define
y∗(x) as the value of y that solves u1(x, y) = k, if this equation has a positive solution,
and zero otherwise. Since u1 is strictly decreasing in y, there is a unique value y
∗(x).
This defines the function y∗(x), and consider x values such that y∗(x) > 0; on
this range, y∗(.) is differentiable, strictly increasing when u is supermodular and
strictly decreasing when u is submodular. Let x∗ be the value of x that solves
u1(x, y
∗(x)) = k, and let y∗ := y∗(x∗). Since u is strictly concave, there is unique
solution, so that the socially efficient level of consumption (x∗, y∗) is unique.
We will consider two distinct information structures, which differ only in the
information observed by firm 2.
• First period consumption is observed by firm 2.
• Transactions are private and firm 2 does not observe either offers or choices.
Our notion of equilibrium is sequential equilibrium: we require that the buyer’s
choices are sequentially rational. Further, when seller 1’s offer is unobserved by seller
2, then any deviation by seller 1 does not affect the buyer’s beliefs about the pricing
scheme that will be offered by seller 2.
3.1 Observable consumption
Consider the situation where first-period consumption is perfectly observed by
the second-period seller. The pricing scheme offered by seller 1 may or may not
be observed by seller 2, this does not matter; the price paid by the consumer in
period one does not affect incentives in period two since the consumer has quasi-
linear utility. In this case, seller 2 acts a Stackelberg leader. The quantity that seller
1 sells is chosen so as to maximize the joint payoff of seller 1 and the consumer,
over the two periods, since seller 1 can extract all the surplus. Since seller 2 is a
monopolist, in period 2, the consumer gets no surplus in the second period, and her
payoff is equal to that from choosing the outside option, i.e. it equals u(x, 0).5 The
consumer’s value from consuming x equals
u(x, 0)− p.
If the consumer does not buy from the first period monopolist, her overall payoff
equals u(0, 0) (since her second period continuation payoff after any x always equals
5Seller 2 chooses y = y∗(x), and sets q = u(x, y∗(x)) − u(x, 0). Thus the consumer’s second
period payoff u(x, y∗(x)) − q equals u(x, 0), since payments made to seller 1 are already sunk.
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u(x, 0). Since the first period seller optimally sets p so that
p(x) = u(x, 0)− u(0, 0),
the bundle that maximizes the first period profits when consumption is observable,
xo, satisfies
u1(x
o, 0) = k.
We shall assume throughout:
A3: yo := y∗(xo) > 0.
This assumption ensures that the first seller cannot serve the customer alone and
the second seller plays a meaningful role in this market. An alternative formulation
for this assumption is u2(x
o, 0) > k.
Proposition 1. Suppose that first period consumption x is observed by the second
period seller. If u is submodular, then xo > x∗ so that the first period monopolist
induces excessive consumption relative to the first best. If u is supermodular, then
xo < x∗, so that the first period seller induces underconsumption relative to the first
best. Second period consumption is always (conditionally) efficient.
The proof of this proposition is intuitive. First-period inefficiency arises from
the fact that the first period seller maximizes the consumer’s second period outside
option, u(x, 0), rather than the consumer’s utility associated with her actual con-
sumption, u(x, yo). When u is supermodular, the maximizer of u(x, 0) is strictly less
than the maximizer of u(x, y∗(x)), since y∗(xo) > 0. When u is submodular, the
maximizer of u(x, 0) is strictly less than x∗.
Finally, note that firm 1 need not restrict the consumer to a singleton menu. It
could, for example, offer a two-part tariff, where the price per unit is set at marginal
cost k, and the fixed fee A is such that A + kxo equals p, the optimal price for xo
under the singleton menu. The consumer will choose xo, and so the outcome will be
the same as in the proposition above.
We note that both x∗, the efficient level, and xo, the consumption level when it
is observable, play an important role in the analysis when transactions are entirely
private.
4 Private Transactions
We now analyze the main specification of our model, where seller 2 can observe
neither the offer made by seller 1 nor the consumer’s choice in the first period.
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4.1 Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
Our first result is that there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium in this
case, either in the supermodular or the submodular case. To gain some intuition for
this result, consider the case where u is submodular. Let us see why consuming xo in
the first period is not an equilibrium. Suppose firm 2 believes that the consumer has
indeed consumed xo. In this case, firm 2 would offer yo, at a price q = u(xo, yo) −
u(xo, 0). Given that this is firm 2’s offer, the payoff of the coalition consisting of firm
1 and the consumer (Figure 1a, dashed line) from any x < xo is given by
u(x, y∗(xo))− q − kx.
Since submodularity of preferences implies that the consumer strictly prefers (y∗(xo), q)
to her outside option when x < xo. The derivative of the above expression with re-
spect to x is negative at x = xo, since xo maximizes u(x, 0) − kx (Figure 1a, solid
line). In other words, the Stackelberg outcome fails to be an equilibrium outcome
when the first period action is not observable for a familiar reason—it is not a best
response to the firm 2’s action.
This raises the question, why is there not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where
the consumer chooses some x˜ < xo? In such a candidate equilibrium, firm 2 will offer
y∗(x˜) at a price q = u(x˜, y∗(x˜)) − u(x˜, 0). Suppose now that firm 1 offers some
x ∈ (x˜, xo]. If the consumer accepts this offer, then it will optimal for her to take
the outside option in the second period. Consequently, the coalition consisting of
the firm 1 and the consumer will get a payoff of
u(x, 0)− kx.
The derivative of this payoff with respect to x is strictly positive, since x < xo
(Figure 1b, dashed line). In other words, there cannot be an equilibrium pure con-
sumption level below the Stackelberg level, since then there is an incentive to deviate
upwards.
The fundamental problem is as follows. On the one hand, first period consump-
tion x must maximize u(x, y) − kx, since the consumer’s actual consumption in
equilibrium is the pair (x, y). On the other hand, x must maximize u(x, 0) − kx,
since the consumer’s second payoff in a pure strategy equilibrium must equal u(x, 0),
the payoff that she gets from the outside option. Since no single value of x can solve
both these maximization problems when one has either strict supermodularity of
submodularity, there cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If u(x, y) is strictly submodular or strictly supermodular, and as-
sumption A3 is satisfied, there does not exist an equilibrium where the consumption
in period 1 is deterministic.
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(b) Seller 1 sells x˜ < xo;
Figure 1: Profitable deviations.
Proof. See appendix A.
This argument can be generalized beyond pure strategies: in equilibrium, the
consumer cannot be indifferent between two different menu items offered by seller 2,
as we show in Lemma 14 in Appendix A.
Since our model bears some resemblance to the common agency model under
complete information (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986), it may be illuminating to see
why the truthful equililibrium of that model fails to be an equilibrium in our setting.
In the common agency version of our model, both sellers choose non-linear price
schedules simultaneously; the consumer observes both schedules before choosing from
each. In a truthful equilibrium, both sellers offer two-part tariffs with the per-unit
price equal to marginal cost and the consumer chooses the efficient bundle (x∗, y∗).
When u is submodular,6 the fixed tariff that firm 2 charges satisfies:7
A2 = u(x
∗, y∗)− u(xo, 0)− k[x∗ − xo]− ky∗.
Firm 2 cannot charge more than this since the consumer will respond by rejecting
firm 2’s offer and increasing her consumption from firm 1 to xo > x∗.
In our model, the firms effectively choose actions simultaneously, since firm 2
does not observe firm 1’s actions. However, the consumer must choose from firm 1
6The argument can be made similarly for the case when u is supermodular.
7Symmetrically, A1 = u(x
∗, y∗) − u(0, y†) − k[y∗ − y†] − kx∗, where y† is the maximizer of
u(0, y)− ky.
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before she sees the offer from firm 2. Consequently, in a candidate equilibrium where
firm 1 chooses (A1, k), and the consumer chooses x
∗, firm 2 can deviate to
A
′
2 = u(x
∗, y∗)− u(x∗, 0)− ky∗.
The difference A
′
2 − A2 equals
[u(xo, 0)− kxo]− [u(x∗, 0)− kx∗] > 0,
since xo is the unique maximizer of u(x, 0)−kx. In other words, the common agency
profile fails to be an equilibrium since the consumer cannot revise her choices at firm
1 after observing firm 2’s offer.
4.2 Endogenous screening: An overview
Having established that first period consumption must be random, we now con-
struct an equilibrium with the following features. Seller 1 charges a two-part tariff
(A, k), where A is the fixed fee, and the price per unit equals the marginal cost k.
The consumer chooses period 1 consumption randomly, according to a continuous
c.d.f. F that has support the interval [x, x]. Since first period consumption x affects
the consumers willingness to pay for the second period bundles, seller 2 offers an
optimal screening menu. It is convenient to think of this menu in the form of a
direct mechanism (yˆ(x), q(x)), where the second period consumption yˆ(x) is strictly
decreasing in x. Under this menu, a consumer with first period consumption x gets
second period indirect utility U(x),8 where U(x)−kx is constant on the interval [x, x].
Consequently, due to the two-part tariff in the first period, with marginal price k,
the consumer is indifferent between all bundles in this interval, and it is optimal for
her to randomize according to the distribution F . Finally, equilibrium is “essentially
unique”. In the supermodular case, the equilibrium outcome is indeed unique. In
the submodular case, if the second period seller caters to first period consumption
levels smaller than x, this may affect the division of payoffs between firm 1 and the
consumer, by affecting the first-period outside option of the consumer.
Let us now examine how this randomization helps overcome the fundamental
impossibility that arose with a pure strategy equilibrium. Consider, for illustrative
purposes, the submodular case. Higher values of x correspond to “lower” types, and
the worst type is the consumer who has consumed x. Such a consumer is held to her
outside option, and thus must be indifferent between accepting the offered second
period bundle designed for her, (yˆ(x), q(x)) and consuming y = 0. If yˆ(x) was
8U(x) := u(x, yˆ(x)) − q(x), and the consumer’s overall payoff equals U(x)− kx−A.
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strictly positive, then the fundamental contradiction that arose in the pure strategy
case would also arise here, since x cannot simultaneously maximize u(x, yˆ(x))− kx
and u(x, 0) − kx. However, if yˆ(x) = 0, then no contradiction arises, and indeed,
that is the resolution to this problem. In other words, the induced distribution F
ensures the exclusion of the consumer who has consumed x.
More generally, given the allocation yˆ(x˜) for any type x˜, x˜ must maximize
u(x, yˆ(x˜)) − kx. That is, given the second period consumption, the first period
bundle chosen by the consumer must maximize her payoff, net of the marginal cost.
In other words, the second period consumption yˆ(x) must satisfy:
u1(x, yˆ(x)) = k, ∀x ∈ [x, x]. (1)
Observe that this uniquely pins down the second period consumption yˆ(x), and
ensures that it is strictly decreasing when u is submodular, and strictly increasing
when u is supermodular.
To summarize, the critical features for any equilibrium are as follows:
1. U(x)− kx is constant for every x ∈ [x, x]. This ensures that the consumer and
seller 1 are indifferent as to which element of [x, x] the consumer chooses.
2. The induced distribution of the first period consumption, F, is such that seller
2 finds it optimal to offer U(x) for each x ∈ [x, x].
3. The second period consumption yˆ(x) satisfies 1, and is therefore strictly de-
creasing in the submodular case, and strictly increasing in the supermodular
case.
4. Finally, the endpoints of the interval [x, x] are pinned down by the character-
istics of the solution to the monopoly screening problem. Since there is no
distortion at the top, the second period consumption of the highest type—e.g.,
x in the submodular case—must be optimal given x. Combined with point
(1) above, this implies that x = x∗, the first best level of consumption (when
utility is supermodular, the highest type corresponds to x which must equal
x∗). Since there is no informational rent at the bottom—e.g., for type x in
the submodular case—her consumption level must maximize the joint payoff
of the consumer and seller 1 given that she takes the outside option 0 in the
second period. This implies x = xo. Thus, the first period consumptions span
the range between first best and the equilibrium consumption in the case when
the past history is observable, while second period consumptions lie between 0
and the first best consumption, y∗.
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4.3 Equilibrium characterization
In this section we formalize the ideas presented in Section 4.2. We begin with the
characterization of the continuation payoff in the second period and then we provide
conditions that pin down the distribution of consumption in the first period.
Proposition 2 has established that in any equilibrium, the first period consump-
tion must be random. Let X denote the support of the equilibrium distribution of
the first period consumption—X is a closed set, by definition. We shall also assume
that every bundle in X is offered and chosen by the consumer.9 Note that X cannot
contain 0—in this case, seller 1’s profits must equal zero, and this cannot be optimal
for seller 1 and the consumer.
Denote a menu offered by seller 2 in equilibrium by (yˆ(x), q(x))x∈X . The second
period indirect utility of the consumer after choosing bundle x in the first period is
U(x) := u(x, yˆ(x))− q(x).
The sum of the payoffs for the consumer and seller 1 if the former chooses x is
Σ(x) := U(x)− kx.
First, we extend U so that it is defined on an open interval I ⊇ X rather than
just the chosen points, X, where I ⊂ (0,∞). For z ∈ I −X, let
U(z) := sup
x∈X
{u(z, yˆ(x))− q(x)}.
Thus, U is specified by prescribing optimal choices for all non-chosen types, and
every point in X lies in the interior of I.
Lemma 3. U(x) is differentiable at every chosen x ∈ X.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Remark 4. The property that U is differentiable on X, the set of types that are
chosen in equilibrium, follows from the endogeneity of types. With exogenous types,
it is well known that U need not be everywhere differentiable. Indeed, this observation
is more general than the specific context of our model.
It is standard in theory of incentives that single-crossing and incentive compati-
bility implies weak monotonicity. However, lemma 3 allows a stronger result.
9That is, we assume that the set of chosen bundles is closed, so that every x ∈ X has an associated
pair (yˆ(x), q(x)) in the menu. This assumption is inessential, but simplifies the statement of some
results.
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Lemma 5. yˆ(x) must satisfy
u1(x, yˆ(x)) = k.
Moreover, yˆ(x) is strictly decreasing (resp. increasing) in x if u is submodular (resp.
supermodular).
Proof. Since U is differentiable at x ∈ X, if x maximizes Σ(.), it must satisfy
Σ′(x) = u1(x, yˆ(x))− k = 0.
Consider a case of submodular utility—i.e., u21 < 0. If x > x˜ then yˆ(x) must be
strictly less than yˆ(x˜), or otherwise the expression for Σ′(.) above will be strictly
negative. Similarly, in the case of supermodular utility—i.e., if u21 > 0, yˆ(x) must
be strictly greater than yˆ(x˜).
Let x denote the minimal element inX and x the maximal element. The following
lemma shows that if individual rationality is satisfied for type x in the submodular
case, then it is satisfied for every other type—although familiar, the result is not
immediate since the outside option u(x, 0) is type dependent. A similar result is true
for the case of supermodular utility.
Lemma 6. If u is submodular, U(x) − u(x, 0) ≥ U(x) − u(x, 0) for all x ∈ X, x 6=
x. Moreover, under any profit maximizing second period contract, U(x) = u(x, 0),
and the individual rationality constraint binds for type x. If u is supermodular, the
individual rationality constraint binds for type x, and is slack for every other type in
X.
Proof. For x < x, since type x can pretend to be x, incentive compatibility implies
that
U(x) ≥ U(x) + u(x, yˆ(x))− u(x, yˆ(x)).
Since U(x) ≥ u(x, 0),
U(x) − u(x, 0) ≥ [u(x, 0)− u(x, 0)]− [u(x, yˆ(x))− u(x, yˆ(x))], (2)
which is non-negative since u is submodular and yˆ(x) ≥ 0.
If U(x) > u(x, 0), then a menu (yˆ(x), q(x)) cannot be profit maximizing, since a
uniform reduction in payoffs U(x) by U(x)− u(x, 0), achieved by raising q(x) by the
same amount, preserves incentive compatibility and increases profits. To obtain the
same result for the case of supermodular u, replace x by x in the above argument.
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The following two lemmata identify x and x. Recall that one of the bounds is
identified using the fact that the highest type’s consumption in the second period
is efficient. In order to identify the other bound, we consider possible deviations by
seller 1 and establish that the lowest type has to consume zero in the second period.
Lemma 7. If u is submodular, x equals the value of x that maximizes u(x, 0)−kx—
i.e., x = xo, and yˆ(x) = 0. If u is supermodular, x equals the value of x that maximizes
u(x, 0)− kx—i.e., x = xo, and yˆ(x) = 0.
Proof. If u is submodular, since the second period participation constraint binds for
the highest value of x that is offered by seller 1 and accepted by the consumer, the
consumer is indifferent between yˆ(x) and zero in the second period. By Lemma 14,
there exists a profitable deviation for seller 1 unless yˆ(x) = 0. Consequently, lemma 5
implies that x must equal the value of x that maximizes
u(x, 0)− kx,
so that x = xo. The proof for the case of supermodular utility is identical.
Lemma 8. If u is submodular, then x = x∗; and if it is supermodular, then x = x∗.
In either case, yˆ(x∗) = y∗.
Proof. Recall that y∗(x) denotes the first best second period quantity conditional on
any level of the first period consumption x. Suppose that u is submodular. On one
hand, since there is no distortion at the top in the second period screening problem,
seller 2 must offer y∗(x) to the consumer who consumed x in the first period. On
the other hand, Lemma 5 establishes that x must satisfy
u1(x, yˆ(x)) = k.
These two conditions imply
u1(x, y
∗(x)) = k,
which means that (x, y∗(x)) satisfies the conditions for the first best allocation. The
first best allocation is unique, therefore x = x∗. When u is supermodular, the ”top”
corresponds to x, and the rest of the argument is the same.
To summarize, the characterization in the above lemmata imply that x = xo and
x = x∗ in the case of submodular utility. When u is supermodular, x = x∗ and
x = xo.
To complete the description of the equilibrium, it remains to specify the distri-
bution of first period consumption F that induces the second period consumption
yˆ(x) and consumer indirect utility U(.) on the interval [x, xˆ], and this is set out in
the following theorem:
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Theorem 9. There exists an equilibrium in which
1. Seller 1 offers a two-part tariff. The entry fee equals to the seller 1’s value
added in the socially efficient consumption stream:
u(x∗, y∗)− kx∗ − u(0, y∗).
The per-unit price equals to the marginal cost k.
2. Seller 2 offers a menu that includes every bundle in [0, y∗]. The bundles in this
menu are indexed by the first period consumption x. The price of a bundle yˆ(x)
is
q(x) = u(x, yˆ(x))− kx− [u(x, 0)− kx]
3. In the first period, the consumer randomly chooses the bundle according to a
distribution F . In the second period, she chooses a consumption yˆ(x) where x
is her first period consumption.
If u is submodular, the support of the distribution F is [x∗, xo] and
F (x) = exp


x∫
x
u21(z, yˆ(z))
u2(z, yˆ(z))− k
dz

 .
If u is supermodular, the support of the distribution F is [xo, x∗] and
F (x) = 1− exp


x∫
x
u21(z, yˆ(z))
k − u2(z, yˆ(z))
dz

 .
Verification that the above distribution indeed accomplishes the task is set out
in Appendix A.3, which completes the proof of the theorem.
4.4 Uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes
All equilibria in this model have several common features. If the utility is super-
modular, any equilibrium must have the same outcome as the equilibrium described
in Theorem 9—that is the distribution of consumptions and the payoffs of the sell-
ers and the consumer must be the same.10 If the utility is submodular, there is a
10It is possible to generate this equilibrium outcome in several different ways. For example, seller
1 can perform the randomization and present the consumer with a single x, where x has distribution
F .
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continuum of equilibria outcomes; however these outcomes only differ because they
distribute differently the surplus between seller 1 and the consumer—seller 2’s payoff
and the distribution of consumptions are invariant. Since the allocation is invariant
across these equilibria, we say that the equilibrium outcome is essentially unique.
The multiplicity of payoff division in the submodular case arises because seller
2 can add items that are larger than y∗ to his menu and price any quantity above
y∗ at marginal cost. Every such item (q, y) satisfies y = y∗ + δ for some δ > 0 and
q = q(y∗)+kδ. Let y˜ denote the largest such item such that u2(0, y˜) ≥ k. These items
on the menu will not be chosen on equilibrium path. However, if the consumer decides
not to consume in the first period, then y˜ becomes the most attractive on the menu,
and gives the consumer a strictly higher payoff than (q(y∗), y∗) because u2(0, y
∗) > k.
Therefore, the value of the first-period outside option is increasing in y˜, but these
items do not affect firm 2’s payoff. By offering large y˜, seller 2 reallocates the first-
period surplus from seller 1 to the consumer, but does not modify the distribution
of consumptions or his own payoff.
To formalize these ideas we characterize the objects that are invariant across all
equilibria. We focus on the submodular case, since equilibrium outcomes are unique
when u is supermodular.11 Fix an equilibrium σ of the game. Let Vσ denote the
consumer’s ex ante utility and let pi1,σ denote the expected profit of seller 1 in this
equilibrium. Let Σσ := Vσ+pi1,σ denote the sum of payoffs of the consumer and seller
1. Also, let Xσ denote the set of the first-period consumptions chosen in equilibrium
σ, and Uσ(x) denote the information rent of the consumer after choosing x in the
first period of equilibrium σ. Let σ˜ denote the specific equilibrium constructed in
the previous section, the support of which is the largest possible set, Xσ˜ = [x
∗, xo].
Note, that by Lemmas 7 and 8, Xσ ⊂ Xσ˜.
Lemma 10. For any equilibrium σ : Σσ = Σσ˜ and for any x ∈ Xσ : Uσ(x) = Uσ˜(x).
Proof. By Lemma 7 the maximal quantity offered and chosen in period one equals
xo in any equilibrium, and the informational rent that accrues to the consumer is
zero in this case. Since xo is in the support of every equilibrium, for any equilibrium
σ
Σσ = u(x
o, 0)− kxo = Σσ˜.
For all x∗ ∈ Xσ the following holds in equilibrium
Σσ˜ = Uσ(x)− kx,
therefore Uσ(x) = Uσ˜(x).
11Formally, the results below apply to both cases.
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In the light of this proposition, we write Σ and U(x) for the payoffs that arise
in any equilibrium. Let F denote the c.d.f. associated with σ˜, as defined in the
previous section, and let f denote the associated density.
Theorem 11. 1. If u is supermodular, then the equilibrium outcome is unique.
2. If u is submodular, the equilibrium outcome is essentially unique. In every
equilibrium,
(a) the distribution of the first-period consumption is F with the support on
[x∗, xo];
(b) the items of the second-period menu that are chosen on equilibrium path
are {(q(x), yˆ(x))}x∈[x∗,xo]; and
(c) the sum of the equilibrium payoffs of seller 1 and the consumer is Σ.
Proof. The proof is in appendix A.4.
The only difference between the cases of sub- and supermodular utilities is the
effect of second-period items that are not chosen by the consumer on equilibrium
path. In the case of supermodular utility, these items make no difference. However,
in the case of submodular utility, if the seller in the second period offers items
y > y∗ in the menu (but makes them unattractive to the consumer who consumed
x ∈ [x∗, xo]), he may make the outside option in the first period more valuable to
the consumer. Such additions to the menu may affect the prices in the first period
without affecting the equilibrium consumption.
4.5 Privacy: Effects on welfare, consumer surplus and prof-
its
Our analysis shows that consumers’ privacy dramatically affects equilibrium out-
comes. The equilibrium outcomes under privacy are very different from the equilib-
rium outcome in the benchmark, in which past consumption is observed by seller 2.
This has efficiency and payoff consequences. We find that under privacy:
(i) Social welfare is greater;
(ii) Consumer’s utility is greater and seller 2’s profit is larger;
(iii) Seller 1’s profit is lower.
(iv) the sum of seller 1’s profit and consumer utility is invariant.
16
The most interesting of these results is that total welfare increases under con-
sumer privacy. To understand this, fix attention on the submodular case. When
transactions are public, there is excessive consumption in the first period, at xo, in
order to improve the second period outside option of the consumer, while second pe-
riod consumption is conditionally efficient. Under private transactions, first period
consumption becomes more efficient—indeed, it lies in the interval [x∗, xo]. Although
second period consumption is no longer constrained efficient, the improvement in first
period efficiency more than offsets this.
Seller 2 is also better off under consumer privacy, since his ignorance protects him
from being exploited as a Stackelberg follower. This more than offsets his consequent
inability to fully extract consumer surplus.
The consumer is better off since privacy increases her outside option in the first
period. Since her choices are not observed by seller 2, the consumer can choose the
outside option in period 1 without causing seller 2 to increase the prices in period
2. This increases the value of the first-period outside option as compared to the
benchmark with observable consumption.
Finally, the result that the sum of seller 1’s profit and consumer utility is the same
as under observable past consumption may appear surprising. However, the intuition
is straightforward — this sum under privacy is the same regardless of the consumer’s
first period choices, and so it equals the sum of payoffs when the consumer chooses
xo in period one and her outside option in period two.12
Let pii, i ∈ {1, 2} denote the profits of the two firms under privacy, and let V
denote the consumer’s payoff, let W denote social welfare. Let Σ := pi1 + V denote
the sum of payoffs of the consumer and the firm. We append superscript o to each
of these variables to denote their equilibrium values under the observable transac-
tions benchmark—e.g. the consumer’s payoff is V o. The subscript σ—associates a
variable with equilibrium σ under privacy. We denote by σ˜ the specific equilibrium
characterized in Theorem 9, where the second-period menu was minimal.
Theorem 12. If u is supermodular, then
(i) Σ = Σo;
(ii) pi1 < pi
o
1 and V > V
o; and
(iii) W −W o = pi2 − pi
o
2 > 0.
If u is submodular, then for any equilibrium σ
12When the past is observable, the consumer’s overall payoff is the same whether she buys or
does not buy in the second period.
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(i) Σσ = Σ
o ∀σ;
(ii) pi1,σ ≤ pi1,σ˜ < pi
o
1 and Vσ ≥ Vσ˜ > V
o; and
(iii) Wσ˜ −W
o = Wσ −W
o = pi2,σ − pi
o
2 > 0.
Proof. Note that the first-period surplus, Σ, can be evaluated at any point in the
support. In particular, at xo, the consumer takes her outside option in the second
period, and so
Σ = u(xo, 0)− kxo.
This is identical with the total payoff of the seller 1 and the consumer when
consumption is observable—although the consumer purchases yo > 0, seller 2 appro-
priates the the difference u(xo, yo)−u(xo, 0), and hence the consumer’s continuation
payoff is u(xo, 0). We turn to the distribution of the total payoff between the two
parties in the two cases. In the observable case, the consumer’s payoff equals
V o := u(0, 0).
In the unobservable case, the results now differ depending on whether u is super-
modular or submodular. So we consider these in turn.
When u is supermodular, the consumer who chooses the outside option in the
first period, chooses the item yˆ(xo) = 0 in the second period, and therefore gets a
total payoff
V = u(0, 0).
This is exactly equal to V o, and hence unobservability has no distributional effect
on the first period payoffs when u is supermodular.
When u is submodular, there is a continuum of equilibria that differ by the value
of the outside option in the first period. Consider the equilibrium with the smallest
such value—i.e., the equilibrium σ˜ characterized in Theorem 9. In this equilibrium,
if the consumer chooses the outside option in the first period, she buys yˆ(x∗) = y∗
in the second period and, therefore, gets a total payoff
V := Vσ˜ = [u(0, y
∗)− u(x∗, y∗)] + u(x∗, 0).
The difference in payoffs is
V − V o = [u(x∗, 0)− u(0, 0)]− [u(x∗, y∗)− u(0, y∗)] = pio1 − pi1 > 0,
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where pio1 denotes seller 1’s profits in the observable case. The second equality in the
above follows since the total payoff Σ is equal in the two cases. The strict inequality
arises since u is strictly submodular.
Now consider the equilibrium with the largest value of the first-period outside
option. Using the same argument we obtain that
V := [u(0, y∗(0))− u(x∗, y∗)]− k(y∗(0)− y∗) + u(x∗, 0) > V .
and pi1 > pi1. For every V ∈ [V , V ], there exists an equilibrium in which the con-
sumer’s payoff is V and seller 1’s profit is Σ− V .
We conclude that, in any equilibrium, the consumer is strictly better off when
consumption is unobservable, and seller 1 is strictly worse off to exactly the same
extent.
Since Σ is the same across all equilibria including the benchmark case of the
observable past, the gain (loss) of seller 2 from unobservability of past consumption
equals to the increase (decrease) of the social welfare. Moreover, this gain (loss) is
the same for all equilibria because the equilibrium distribution of consumption is the
same.
To see that pi2 > pi
o
2, note that if seller 2 offers a single item (q
o, yo), it will
be accepted with probability 1 because every consumer’s type is better (in terms
of marginal willingness to pay) than xo. The fact that such a menu is not offered
implies that pi2 > pi
o
2.
The equilibrium consumption is distorted by the intertemporal competition be-
tween the sellers in an unusual way. If the utility is submodular, the consumer always
over-consumes in the first period and under-consumes in the second. The realized
social welfare is monotone in the first period consumption.
Remark 13. Equilibrium social welfare conditional on first period consumption x is
decreasing in x when u is submodular, and increasing when u is supermodular.
Proof. Equilibrium social welfare conditional on first period consumption x is
W (x) = u(x, yˆ(x))− k(x+ yˆ(x))
Taking a derivative, we obtain
W ′(x) = u1(x, yˆ(x))− k + yˆ
′(x)u2(x, yˆ(x))− kyˆ
′(x)
= yˆ′(x) [u2(x, yˆ(x))− k] ,
where the second line follows from the first period first order condition, equation
(7). Since the second period consumption is always distorted, the term in square
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Table 1: Example
x y W pi1 pi2 V
a = −1
main model Fig.2a Fig.2c 6.99 [2.92, 3.00] 2.92 [1.08, 1.16]
first best 1.00 1.00 7.00 - - -
observable x 1.17 0.97 6.92 4.08 2.84 0.00
a = −3
main model Fig.2b Fig.2d 5.39 [1.36, 1.81] 1.31 [2.27, 2.72]
first best 0.78 0.78 5.44 - - -
observable x 1.17 0.58 5.10 4.08 1.02 0.00
brackets is always positive, and hence W is increasing in x when yˆ is increasing in
x (i.e., when utility is supermodular), and decreasing in x when yˆ is decreasing in x
(i.e., when utility is supermodular).
4.6 An example
We now consider a numerical example, where u is given by:
u(x, y) = −3x2 − 3y2 + axy + 8x+ 8y
The parameter a = u21(x, y) is a measure of substitutability of the past and current
consumption. We focus on the submodular case, so that a is negative, and focus on
two values, a = −1 and a = −3. The equilibrium values for the variables of interest
are presented in Table 1. The equilibrium distributions of first period consumption
for the two cases are given in Figure 2.
In these two cases, the equilibrium distribution is skewed to the left: most of
the consumers consume an amount close to the socially efficient one. This is also
reflected in the fact that efficiency loss in equilibrium, W ∗ −W , is small compared
to the one in benchmark model with observable consumption, W ∗ −W o.
The distribution of the social welfare is also interesting: consumers and the second
period seller obtain higher payoffs under privacy than when past consumption is
observable. The profit comparison for the first period seller is the opposite of that:
this seller’s profit is reduced by privacy.
Note that the first seller’s loss from privacy equals the consumer’s gain and the
increase in social welfare accrues fully to the second seller, as one would expect from
the results in section 4.5. The example shows that the gain from privacy is much
larger for the consumer than for seller 2.
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Figure 2: Distribution of first period consumption (top row) and second period
consumption (bottom row).
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5 Concluding remarks
We study optimal nonlinear pricing when transactions are private, in the pres-
ence of intertemporal substitutability and complementarity. We show that, even if
consumers are ex ante identical, the equilibrium menus offered by sellers feature a
large variety of bundle sizes paired with quantity discounts. These offerings give rise
to endogenous taste heterogeneity across consumers.
In equilibrium, the seller who faces consumers without private information offers
a two-part tariff to facilitate the creation of endogenous heterogeneity. Subsequently,
the seller who serves consumers with endogenous private information offers a screen-
ing menu.
We derive testable relationship between the price dispersion and the degree of
inter-temporal substitutability or complementarity. In our model, if past choices are
not observed by the sellers, the consumers necessarily retain some surplus in the
form of information rent. The informational content of the past choices depends on
the degree of inter-temporal substitutability or complementarity and it affects the
optimal menus offered by the sellers. Our substantive policy finding is that privacy
improves welfare and consumer surplus, and mitigates the distortions due to seller
monopoly power. However, in our model, firms will not voluntarily protect consumer
privacy, even when consumers are sophisticated, since making transactions public is
a way for upstream firms to enhance their monopoly power. Consequently, there is
a role for regulation.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
If the consumption in period 1 is deterministic, say x˜, any best reply by seller 2
will include an item (q, y) in the second period menu such that the consumer chooses
this item and
u(x˜, y)− q = u(x˜, 0)
u2(x˜, y) = k.
If such a menu is expected, seller 1 has a profitable deviation—he can induce a
consumption x > x˜ in the first period and receive a higher profit as a result. Formally,
this is established by the following lemma.
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Lemma 14. Suppose the consumer buys x˜ in the first period and chooses one of the
two different available options—(q1, y1) and (q2, y2)—from the menu in the second
period. If the consumer is indifferent between these two options—i.e., if
u(x˜, y1)− q1 = u(x˜, y2)− q2,
then one of the sellers has a profitable deviation.
Proof. We prove this lemma for the case of submodular utility u(x, y). The proof
for the case of supermodular utility u(x, y) is very similar and therefore omitted.
Without loss of generality, let y1 < y2.
First, if u2(x˜, y2) < k, the seller in period 2 can modify his menu to weakly
increase his profit. To see that, consider the set
X = {x | u2(x, y(x)) < k, and (x, y(x)) is in the support of consumer’s strategy}
If the seller replaces every item y(x), x ∈ X with the item y∗(x) (recall that u2(x, y
∗(x)) =
k) and reduces the price of this item by u(x, y(x)) − u(x, y∗(x)), he will guarantee
that a consumer with history x ∈ X will purchase y∗(x), and the profit from selling
these items will be strictly higher since u(x, y)−ky is maximized at y∗(x). Therefore,
we can restrict our attention to the case of u2(x˜, y2) ≥ k.
The difference in profit between the two options that are offered in the second
period are
q2 − ky2 − (q1 − ky1) = u(x˜, y2)− u(x˜, y1)− k(y2 − y1) > 0.
If the consumer chooses (q1, y1), seller 2 can reduce q2 by arbitrarily small but positive
amount and, thus, increase his profit.
If the consumer chooses (q2, y2), seller 1 has a profitable deviation. Indeed, if seller
1 induces x > x˜ instead of x˜, the consumer will choose either (q1, y1) or another, even
smaller bundle. Similarly, if seller 1 induces x < x˜ instead of x˜, the consumer will
choose either (q2, y2) or another, even larger bundle. Thus, the total payoff of the
consumer and seller 1, Σ(x), is bounded from below by
Σ(x) ≥ Σ˜(x) :=
{
u(x, y1)− q1 − kx , if x ≥ x˜
u(x, y2)− q2 − kx , if x < x˜.
and Σ(x˜) = Σ˜(x˜) = u(x˜, y1)− q1 − kx˜. The function Σ˜(x) is continuous and u is
submodular, hence
D+Σ˜(x˜)−D−Σ˜(x˜) = u1(x˜, y1)− u1(x˜, y2) > 0.
Therefore Σ˜(x) cannot achieve the maximum at x˜, and so cannot Σ(x).
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Fix x ∈ X, and yˆ(x). Consider the payoff of the consumer in the second period,
U(x + δ)—this is well defined for δ sufficiently small since U is defined on the open
interval I. Since x + δ can choose the contract chosen by the consumer with the
first-period consumption x,
U(x+ δ) ≥ u(x+ δ, yˆ(x))− q(x)
Thus, for δ > 0
U(x+ δ)− U(x)
δ
≥
u(x+ δ, yˆ(x))− u(x, yˆ(x))
δ
.
The above inequality implies
D+U(x) := lim inf
δ→0+
U(x+ δ)− U(x)
δ
≥ u1(x, yˆ(x)). (3)
Since the inequality for δ < 0 has a reversed sign, this yields
D−U(x) := lim sup
δ→0−
U(x+ δ)− U(x)
δ
≤ u1(x, yˆ(x)). (4)
Now, the total payoff of seller 1 and consumer, Σ(x), equals
Σ(x) = U(x)− kx.
Define:
D+U(x) := lim sup
δ→0+
U(x+ δ)− U(x)
δ
,
D−U(x) := lim inf
δ→0−
U(x+ δ)− U(x)
δ
.
If x ∈ X, then, since x is chosen, it must maximize Σ(x), and necessary conditions
are
Σ+(x) = D+U(x)− k ≤ 0,
Σ−(x) = D−U(x)− k ≥ 0.
These inequalities imply D+U(x) ≤ D−U(x). In conjunction with the inequalities
(3) and (4), this implies that for any x ∈ X,
D+U(x) = D+U(x) = D
−U(x) = D−U(x) = u1(x, yˆ(x)).
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 9
We focus on the case of submodular utility. Since the argument is very similar
when utility is supermodular, we omit it.
The proof consists of the following steps:
1. We derive necessary conditions for profit maximization in periods 1 and 2. We
use these conditions to solve for the equilibrium menus and the distribution of
the first period consumption F . When deriving the optimality conditions we
conjecture and later verify that the distribution F has at most one atom (if
the atom exists it is at x∗).
2. We show that the solution we get for F is a cumulative distribution function—
i.e., it is non-decreasing and right-continuous.
3. We show that the menus that we find induce the conjectured consumer choices
(or using the language of the theory of incentives, the menus are incentive-
compatible).
First, we verify that the proposed distribution F induces the second-period con-
sumption yˆ and indirect utility U(x). The outside option of the consumer in the
second period is u(x, 0). If the consumer consumes x in the first period, her contin-
uation utility in the second period is u(x, 0). Therefore
U(x) = u(x, 0)−
x∫
x
u1(z, yˆ(z))dz.
The price charged by the seller 2 for the bundle yˆ(x) is
q(x) = u(x, yˆ(x))− u(x, 0) +
x∫
x
u1(z, yˆ(z))dz. (5)
Hence the expected profit for this seller is
x∫
x
[u(x, yˆ(x))f(x) + u1(x, yˆ(x))F (x)− kyˆ(x)f(x)] dx− u(x, 0).
Maximizing the above expression pointwise, we obtain that the distribution F must
satisfy the first order condition
u2(x, yˆ(x))f(x) + u21(x, yˆ(x))F (x)− kf(x) = 0. (6)
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Seller 1 makes the consumer indifferent between the inside and the outside op-
tions, therefore, he charges a price for amount x that equals
p(x) = u(x, yˆ(x))− u(0, yˆ(x)) +
x∫
x
u1(z, yˆ(z))dz.
In particular, the price for the bundle x equals
p(x) = u(x, yˆ(x))− u(0, yˆ(x)).
Seller 1’s profit from selling a bundle x has to be independent of x. Hence
u1(x, yˆ(x))− k = 0. (7)
Equations (7) and (6) pin down unknown functions F and yˆ.
Lemma 15. Suppose that F and yˆ solve equations (7) and (6). Then F is a c.d.f.
and yˆ is strictly decreasing (strictly increasing resp.) whenever u is submodular
(supermodular resp.).
Proof. By taking a derivative of equation (7) with respect to x we get
yˆ′(x) = −
u11(x, yˆ(x))
u21(x, yˆ(x))
therefore sgn(yˆ′(x)) = sgn(u21(x, yˆ(x))).
The solution to equation (6) is
lnF (x) =
x∫
x
u21(z, yˆ(z))
u2(z, yˆ(z))− k
dz (8)
This solution is increasing in x if u2(x, yˆ(x)) ≥ k for all x ∈ [x, x]. Lower bound x
solves u2(x, yˆ(x)) = k (see Hellwig, 2010). Moreover, since u is concave
d
dx
u2(x, yˆ(x)) = u21(x, yˆ(x)) + u22(x, yˆ(x))yˆ
′(x)
= u21(x, yˆ(x))−
u11(x, yˆ(x))
u21(x, yˆ(x))
u22(x, yˆ(x))
=
u22(x, yˆ(x))u11(x, yˆ(x))− (u21(x, yˆ(x)))
2
−u21(x, yˆ(x))
≥ 0.
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Therefore, u2(x, yˆ(x)) is increasing in x and u2(x, yˆ(x)) ≥ k for all x ∈ [x, x]. To sum-
marize, the solution F (x) is a non-decreasing right-continuous function and F (x) = 1,
therefore F (x) is a c.d.f.13
The final step in the proof is established by the following lemma, that shows that
the consumer will choose option yˆ(x) from the second period menu if she consumed
x in the first period.
Lemma 16. If yˆ(x) is decreasing and utility is submodular (or if yˆ(x) is increasing
and utility is supermodular), equation (5) implies
u(x, yˆ(t))− q(t) ≤ u(x, yˆ(x))− q(x)
for all x, t ∈ [x, x].
Proof. Consider x > t. Since yˆ(x) is decreasing and utility is submodular (or, alter-
natively, yˆ(x) is increasing and utility is supermodular), we have
q(t)− q(x) = u(t, yˆ(t))− u(x, yˆ(x)) +
x∫
t
u1(z, yˆ(z))dz ≥
u(t, yˆ(t))− u(x, yˆ(x)) +
x∫
t
u1(z, yˆ(t))dz =
u(t, yˆ(t))− u(x, yˆ(x)) + u(x, yˆ(t))− u(t, yˆ(t)) =
u(x, yˆ(t))− u(x, yˆ(x)).
The case with x < t is identical.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 11
Our proof hinges on two facts that have been established. First, for any equilib-
rium σ with support Xσ : Uσ(x) = U(x), and second, yˆσ(x), the bundle consumed
in the second period in equilibrium σ by the consumer who consumed x in the past,
is uniquely determined and coincides with that under σ˜ : yˆ(x). In other words, the
13Strictly speaking, the ODE (6) has a solution (8) on (x, x], but we can right-continuously extend
it to x with value of lim
x→x+0
exp
[
x∫
x
u21(z,yˆ(z))
u2(z,yˆ(z))−k
dz
]
. If this value is strictly positive, the distribution
F has an atom at x.
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payoff and the second-period consumption for any chosen first-period consumption
is the same across all equilibria.
The argument is completed via the following lemma, that shows that any equi-
librium distribution cannot have either gaps in the support or atoms (except for a
possible atom at x∗).
Lemma 17. Let σ be an equilibrium, and let G denote the c.d.f. of first period
consumption corresponding to σ. The support of G equals [x∗, xo], and G cannot
have atoms.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that G has a gap (x1, x2) in its support. Sequential
rationality for the second-period seller implies that the consumer who consumed x1
in the first period is indifferent between the item that she chooses in the second
period and the item that is chosen by the consumer with a history x2. This violates
Lemma 14. Therefore, distribution G cannot have gaps in its support.
Suppose, by contradiction, that G has an atom at x˜ 6= x∗. Hellwig (2010) estab-
lishes that in that case yˆ(x)—consumption in the second period as a function of the
consumer’s history—is discontinuous at x˜. Since G has no gaps in its support, by
Lemma 5, yˆ(x) must be continuous on [x∗, xo] hence the contradiction.
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